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Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Reason 
 
Introduction 
Constructivism as a metanormative theory is a relatively recent development in philosophy, 
although its roots can be traced back to Kant.  John Rawls brought constructivism onto the 
scene in the form of his political philosophy and some of these ideas were then developed by 
Thomas Scanlon in his normative theory.  But it is probably not until Christine Korsgaard 
that we have an attempt to bring constructivism into the domain of metanormative theory.  It 
has since become a hotly debated issue, with a lot of the discussion focusing on Korsgaard’s 
work.  Recently, more constructivists have emerged with interesting takes on how to make 
constructivism a plausible metanormative theory, such as Aaron James and Sharon Street.  
Now that constructivism is firmly on the metanormative scene we can begin to unpick the 
main features of the theory and enquire as to how tenable it is. 
Constructivism, in either its normative or metanormative guise, is roughly the view 
that there are correct answers to normative questions because there is a correct way of 
answering them; a normative judgement can be established and justified because it is the 
outcome of a correctly followed procedure for answering the normative question at hand.  For 
metanormative constructivism, normative judgements can be objectively true, not because 
they are correctly tracking independent normative facts, as a traditional realist would have it, 
but because it has been ‘constructed’; normative judgements are never true prior to them 
being the outcome of the correctly followed procedure.  It is a theory of normative 
judgements and how they can be said to be true, where the truth of a normative judgement is 
explained in terms of the norms of practical reason being correctly followed. 
If all of this can be fleshed out in a plausible way, then constructivism is a very 
appealing metanormative theory; we get all of the benefits of realism without any of the 
metaphysical baggage.  The constructivist will not have to invoke any mysterious non-natural 
properties or risk falling prey to the open question argument.  The challenge for 
constructivism, however, is to adequately explain what the ‘procedure’ is and how it is meant 
to guarantee the truth of a normative judgement.  That is the focus of this paper. 
In Chapter 1 I distinguish between constructivism as a normative and metanormative 
theory and try to give it the most charitable interpretation possible.  I discuss how best to 
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construe the notion of ‘procedure’ and conclude that it is best understood as practical reason.  
I argue that if it is practical reason that is meant to guarantee the truth of a normative 
judgement, then the constructivist has to tell us something about the normativity of practical 
reason, how it is that there are certain ways we ought to think in regards to practical 
problems.  In Chapter 2 I briefly discuss a number of ways of answering this question and 
then focus on the constitutivist theory offered by Korsgaard and James.  I explain how such a 
theory accounts for the norms of practical reason and how this view can be compatible with 
constructivism.  I then outline David Enoch’s ‘schmagency’ objection to constitutivism and 
how it undermines the account of the norms of the procedure of construction.  In Chapter 3 I 
outline Street’s version of constructivism and her account of the normativity of practical 
reason and suggest how it might deal with Enoch’s objection.  I argue that ultimately Street 
falls prey to the schmagency objection due to weaknesses in her account of practical reason.  
Finally, I conclude by suggesting a number of directions the constructivist might take if they 


















To get a clear understanding of constructivism and its distinguishing features as a theory, it 
will be useful to make a distinction between constructivism as a normative and a 
metanormative theory.  Following Enoch (2009: 323) I will refer to these divisions as local 
and global respectively.  As a metanormative view, constructivism is aiming to give an 
account of normative thought and discourse, showing how it is possible for a normative claim 
to be true without it being the case that it is referring to an independent normative fact.  Local 
constructivism is a first-order view, establishing the conclusion of a normative claim through 
a constructive method.  Local constructivism is concerned with moral claims that are argued 
for with a constructive procedure; global constructivism is concerned with practical 
normative statements that can be taken as true and objectively so because they are the correct 
outcome of a specified procedure.  Local constructivism aims to give a constructive account 
of a subset of normative thought; global constructivism aims to show how all practical 
normative claims can be true.  There are similarities in the methods between the two kinds of 
constructivism but also crucial differences in regards to their scope.  It will be useful to begin 
with a discussion of what is possibly the most famous local constructivist view: the political 
philosophy of John Rawls.  In seeing how Rawls constructs his two principles of justice, we 
will have in mind the kind of the thing a constructivist is doing and then extrapolate that 
feature of the theory to see how it is meant to work in regards to all practical normative 
claims. 
Rawls employs a constructive procedure to establish a certain set of principles of 
justice for the organisation of the structure of a liberal democracy.  For Rawls, they are not 
true because they are referring to independent normative facts – facts of the normative realm 
of justice – but because they are the outcome of a specific kind of procedure, the procedure 
that is right for establishing the principles of justice.  Rawls holds that any agent, in a certain 
specified situation called the ‘Original Position’, would choose the same two principles of 
justice and thus ‘construct’ them.  The agents that do the constructing are free and rational, 
and are ignorant of any particular contingencies of themselves.  They are placed behind a 
‘veil of ignorance’ where they know nothing of their gender, class, talents, nationality, place 
in history, concept of the good, or anything else that could induce bias and influence their 
selection of the principles of justice.  The agents are fully rational in that they have full 
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capability of practical reasoning.  They have an adequate knowledge of human psychology 
and political institutions so as to be informed enough in their choice of the principles of 
justice that will structure societies’ institutions.  The agents are also taken to hold particular 
normative judgements implicit in a liberal democracy, namely concerning the freedom and 
equality of all people.  In such a position, all agents would choose Rawls’ two principles of 
justice, and these two principles would be the correct ones because they were ‘constructed’ 
from the Original Position (Rawls 1971, Ch. 3). 
These principles were not the correct ones prior to the agent going through the 
procedure of choosing them in the Original Position.  They are true because they were 
constructed from the right procedure; one that embodies certain normative claims about the 
irrelevance of certain contingencies and the freedom and equality of all humans.  These 
normative ingredients in the procedure are not constructed from the Original Position itself; 
they are taken to be a part of the procedure and set the standards for which constructed 
principles are meant to apply; if the principles are in accordance with these standards then 
they are to be constructed; if not, then they are false.  A subset of the normative domain – 
normative claims about justice – are constructed from a procedure that embodies other 
practical normative claims.  Global constructivism aims not to construct a subset of practical 
normative claims; rather it aims to show how all practical normative claims can be true 
because they are constructed from a procedure.  Global constructivism takes this basic idea – 
of constructing normative judgements from a procedure that has standards to follow – to give 
an account of all practical normative claims. 
Statements of the form ‘A ought to Φ’ are far more broad in scope than ‘The right 
principles to govern society are A and B’.  The former encompasses all practical normative 
judgements, whether moral or instrumental, whereas the latter is itself a specific kind of 
normative judgement.  Global constructivism aims to show why these former normative 
judgements can be objectively true, not use a certain argumentative method to demonstrate a 
particular conclusion about a normative area.  What is supposedly distinctive of the theory is 
that it is arguing that normative judgements can be true because they can be the outcome of a 
correctly followed procedure; whereas for Rawls, his two principles are supposedly true 
because they followed a procedure.  Constructivism is not aiming to conclude in a true 
normative judgement like Rawls; rather it is a theory of why normative judgments can be true 




For the local constructivist, the procedure specified is something entirely 
hypothetical; we are asked to imagine some hypothetical agent, in some specified situation, 
and imagine the reasoning that will proceed to a conclusion.  For the global constructivist, the 
procedure is something more familiar: practical reasoning.  We all engage in practical 
reasoning on a daily basis; it is not something hypothetical, but immediate.  The procedure is 
one that humans engage in when faced with practical problems; we engage from the ‘first-
person standpoint’ and make a decision as to what to do.  It is this standpoint and this 
decision making procedure that the constructivist wants to focus on.  Although of course, 
different global constructivists construe the procedure of practical reason in different ways. 
There is disagreement amongst constructivists and their commentators as to whether 
the procedure of construction is meant to be considered real and of our world or idealised in 
some sense.  All are in agreement that it is indeed human practical reasoning that is the 
procedure of construction; it is this feature of our minds that actually engages in normative 
problems and results in normative judgements.  The dispute seems to be over how exactly to 
construe practical reason; whether the procedure is the practical reason of this world, engaged 
in by real agents, or whether it is some idealised form of practical reason that an agent with 
flawless reasoning would engage in.  Street’s constructivism, for example, involves the actual 
normative judgements of real agents in the construction of the truth of other normative 
judgements (2008; 2010; Forthcoming).  Whereas for James, practical reasoning, if done 
correctly in optimal conditions, will always result in the right normative judgement and so 
rules out brute error of normative judgement.  It is thus an idealised form of practical reason 
(2007; Forthcoming).  For James then, the constructed judgements are the ones that would be 
constructed by an agent that correctly followed the norms of practical reason in optimal 
conditions.  For Street, there are no optimal conditions or the imagining of an agent perfectly 
reasoning practically; the procedure is one followed by real agents involving real judgements.  
James’ view, whilst idealised, is not hypothetical in the way Rawls’ procedure is; James’ 
view still involves something we are very familiar with – practical reasoning – whereas 
Rawls’ Original Position is something entirely fictional, devised specifically for the 
construction of principles of justice.  Whilst James’ procedure is idealised for the 
construction of all normative judgements, it is not fictional; it essentially involves practical 
reason, and that is not too unfamiliar, even if his version is idealised.  In this sense then, he is 
more in line with Street with her insistence on focusing on the real judgements of agents in 
the construction of practical normative judgements.  Both Street and James, whilst differing 
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on how to construe the procedure, still agree on what that procedure essentially is: practical 
reason engaged in by human agents. 
1.2 
The procedure of construction can guarantee the truth of a normative judgement, not by 
tracking normative facts, but rather by ‘constructing’ the truth once the procedure has been 
correctly followed.  As we saw in 1.1, the global constructivist construes the procedure of 
construction as practical reason; thus, to follow the procedure correctly for construction, one 
must follow the norms of practical reason.  I shall draw on the work of Korsgaard, James, and 
Street, and weave together the defining aspects of their views that they have in common in 
order to present the clearest and most plausible interpretation of the kind of procedure that a 
constructivist has in mind. 
The procedure is what is meant to guarantee the truth of the judgement because it is 
the right kind of procedure for engaging in practical problems and has standards that can be 
correctly followed.  This differentiates it from realism, which would say that the procedure is 
right because it tracks the normative truths in the right way.  Following Korsgaard then, we 
can say that the constructivist makes a distinction between procedural realism and substantive 
realism.  As Korsgaard puts it: 
Procedural moral realism is the view that there are answers to moral questions: that is, there 
are right and wrong ways to answer them.  Substantive moral realism is the view that there 
are answers to moral questions because there are moral facts or truths, which those questions 
ask about (1996: 35). 
For the constructivist then, the procedure is not being employed to track some pre-existing 
independent normative fact; it is what we have to do to be able to decide how to answer our 
normative questions.  However, this does not stop there being right answers to normative 
questions because there is a correct way of answering them.  There does not have to be a pre-
existing fact for us to decide what to do; all that is needed is for there be a ‘correct or best 
procedure’ for answering our normative questions and then ‘there is some way of applying 
the concepts of the right and the good’ (Ibid).  Our normative questions are presented to us as 
practical problems; it is us that have to engage with them, think through what to do and what 
would be right.  It is thus us that engages in practical reason and make the resulting 
judgement.  Because of this then, the constructivist thinks it is important to note that we 
engage with moral and normative questions from the first-personal standpoint. 
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When one thinks about a normative problem and engages with the reasons for and 
against an action it is done from the first-personal standpoint; that is, it is done by an agent, 
someone doing the thinking and deliberating.  It is not done externally; that is, it is not done 
from a standpoint outside of deliberation.  It is in the first-person standpoint that the decision 
of what to do is made.  It is decided within this practical standpoint by someone of what they 
should do and what course of action to take; the procedure is undertaken from the first-person 
standpoint resulting in decisions of what to do, and these decisions, if the procedure is 
correctly followed, are right answers to practical problems.  There is a difference in emphasis 
on this standpoint depending on the constructivist: Street, for example, places great emphasis 
on what she thinks are defining features of this standpoint (which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3).  What is important to note for now is that the constructivist thinks the constructed 
judgements are made after engaging in practical reason, and this is done by agents first-
personally. 
How practical reason is characterised differs entirely on the constructivist philosopher 
in question, but all seem to be united on one thing.  When the agent engages in practical 
reason from the first person standpoint and deliberates, the agent may follow the rules of this 
procedure correctly or incorrectly; that is to say, they may succeed in following the norms of 
practical reason or not.  If the norms are accorded with and practical reason has been 
successful, the resulting judgement is true.  It is true precisely because the correct procedure 
has been followed in the correct way; practical reason does not track independent truth, it 
only engages in practical problems and so long as its norms are followed, the resulting 
judgement is correct. 
Once the true judgement of what to do is constructed, there is then a normative reason 
for action.  If the constructed judgement is true then it is the correct prescription of what the 
agent in question ought to do.  The judgement will be something like ‘A ought to Φ,’ and as 
long as the procedure has been correctly followed, this will be the right judgement and 
therefore it is the case that A ought to perform Φ.  Normative judgements purport to be 
authoritative, providing an overriding reason to perform a certain course of action.  If the 
constructed judgement is correct, then an overriding reason to perform Φ has been 
constructed for A to follow.  Constructivism therefore constructs norms; once the truth of a 
judgement is constructed, it is a fact that the relevant course of action really ought to be 
followed by the relevant agent; they have a normative reason to follow the action; a standard 
has been constructed that they ought to adhere to. 
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We can see now then that constructivism can be distinguished by two things: one 
concerning the truth conditions of normative judgements and the other a metaphysical feature 
concerning the relation between the truth of the judgement and the thinking the agent does in 
making that judgement.1  The judgements that result from the procedure are substantive; they 
hold that some actual course of action is right and ought to be followed.  A realist would hold 
that the judgement can only be true because it is a judgement about an independent normative 
fact.  But for the constructivist, what makes the judgement true is that it is the outcome of the 
correct procedure; the judgement’s truth condition is not some independent state of affairs 
that will obtain if the judgement is true; rather the condition is the correct following of the 
norms of practical reason.  The relation of truth for the constructivist is from the procedure to 
the judgement, rather than from a judgement to a fact.  There are no independent conditions 
to be met to guarantee the truth of a judgement; the only condition is the following of the 
constructive procedure.  The truth of the judgement is ‘constructed’ by the following of the 
procedure, and this ‘construction’ is a metaphor for the metaphysical relation of the truth of 
the judgement and how the truth is arrived at.  The metaphysical priority for the truth of the 
judgement is the procedure; there is no truth prior to the outcome of the procedure.  And there 
is no procedure except that done by an agent engaging from the first-personal standpoint and 
making judgements about what they ought to do in regards to practical problems.  It is these 
two features that attempt to make constructivism a distinctive metanormative theory: its 
account of the truth conditions for normative judgements, and the metaphysical priority of the 
procedure to the truth of a judgement. 
1.3 
Constructivism as a metanormative theory aims to explain how a normative judgement may 
be objectively true without invoking any of the metaphysics of the realist.  Normative 
judgements can be taken as true if and only if they are the outcome of the correct procedure – 
practical reason – and the standards of that procedure have been adhered to.  In other words, 
the agent must follow the norms of practical reason for them to make a true normative 
judgement.  The norms of the procedure give guidance as to how to think about the practical 
problems.  Only when the norms of the procedure are followed will the resulting judgement 
have authoritative status.  So how does the constructivist account for the norms of practical 
                                                          
1 This emphasis on constructivism as a metaphysical thesis can primarily be found in Enoch (2009).  An 
emphasis on constructivism as a theory of the truth conditions for normative judgements can be found in 




reason?  What are they exactly?  How are they to be construed?  How is the constructivist to 
explain where they get their authority from?  Must they give a constructivist account for these 
























2. Korsgaard, James and Constitutivism 
2.1 
In the last chapter we saw that the constructivist holds that moral judgements can be true if 
the procedure has been correctly followed and that there is a metaphysical priority of this 
procedure to the truth of the judgement.  The agent cannot make any old judgement however; 
it is only those that are the result of correctly following the procedure; it is by constructing 
judgements through practical reasoning that makes them true.  However practical reason is 
construed by the constructivist, for the procedure to be correctly followed so the output can 
be true, it must be the case that there are norms of practical reason.  It must be the case that 
there are ways of going right and wrong when following the procedure; that is, the procedure 
itself must be normative in some way.  How is the constructivist to account for the 
normativity of practical reason?  The constructivist’s answer here must be one that is 
consistent with their view. 
What are we to think of the norms of practical reason?  Presumably, they are certain 
ways of thinking about practical problems; more importantly, they are meant to be the right 
way to think about them.  As Aaron James puts it ‘Practical reasoning is a process of 
consideration which issues in judgement’ (2007: 315).  These ‘considerations’ cannot be 
arbitrary; they must be guided by norms for our practical thinking to issue in a true 
judgement.  Candidates for such norms could be the ones emphasised by Kantians, that of the 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives.  The hypothetical imperative tells us that we ought 
to take the most relevant means to the end that we will.  If I will the end of ‘catching the train 
at 12:00’ and the most efficient means to achieving this end is by leaving my house at 11:00, 
then I ought to take this means according to the hypothetical imperative.  It is a normative 
principle of practical thought; a way we ought to think about practical problems we face in 
achieving our goals.  What of the categorical imperative?  In the Groundwork Kant states the 
categorical imperative as so: ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law’ (1993: 30).  The categorical imperative states 
then that we ought to only act on principles that are universalisable; that is, principles we can 
expect everyone else to follow.  This clearly rules out a principle, say, of allowing theft; for if 
theft was universalised there would be no property for anyone to steal.  Thus it is a 
contradiction for Kant; for it to be legislated there has to be property, but if it was legislated 
there would be no property. 
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The hypothetical and categorical imperatives then are general, formal principles of 
practical thought, and Korsgaard holds both of them to be norms of practical reasoning 
(2009: Chs. 4 and 5).  James, who holds a similar position to Korsgaard in regards to the 
normativity of the norms of practical reason, instead endorses a multitude of general, formal 
principles of practical reason.  As we have noted, practical reasoning occurs when an agent is 
presented with a practical problem about what course of action to pursue.  We think things 
through according to the norms of practical thought which according to James ‘structure 
one’s awareness of the facts of an agent’s situation and one’s reaction to the facts attended to’ 
(2007: 315).  The norms of practical reason are guides to attending to the facts of the situation 
in which the practical problem is framed for the agent, whereby some facts will be relevant 
and others not.  For James these norms include the Norm of Attention Direction, dictating in 
the situation which facts and possibilities the agent ought to consider; the Norm of Disregard 
dictates that the agent only consider relevant facts and possibilities; the Norm of Favouring 
states that once the agent has their attention directed to certain facts of the situation, certain 
responses are favoured; finally, the Norm of Balancing dictates that the agent weigh the facts 
that count in favour of different responses so to count one as stronger (Ibid: 316-17).  By 
following these general norms, the agent encountering the practical problem will make a 
judgement, and it is only by following these norms that make it the correct judgement.  
Clearly this is different to the Korsgaardian notion of thinking only in accordance with 
Kantian imperatives; the norms are far more varied concerning taking facts into account.  But 
they are similar to Korsgaard in a sense which will become important in the next section, that 
they are constitutive of practical reason. 
2.2 
What makes Korsgaard’s and James’ norms of practical reason normative in the first place; 
that they have the status that they ought to be followed?  What account do they give as to 
why these are the ways for guiding our practical thought that have authority?  We saw in 1.2 
that by constructing judgements with the procedure, those judgements are made true and 
establish norms of conduct.  If constructivism can account for the construction of these 
norms, then must the constructivist give a constructivist account of the norms of practical 
reason?  Presumably the norms of the procedure have their status partly from the fact the 
procedure is the correct one for the task in hand, like Rawls’ Original Position.  What makes 
the procedure and its norms the correct one to follow?  The constructivist must have some 
answer as to why their favoured procedure of construction is the correct one.  Korsgaard, in 
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her 2003, talks of constructivism going ‘all the way down’.  This has been interpreted in 
different ways2, but one way of reading what she means here is that constructivism can 
construct all norms of practical thought; both the normative reasons that the constructed 
judgements give and the principles of practical reason that lead to their construction.  Being 
that we engage in a procedure to construct normative judgements, then maybe we can give a 
further constructivist account of the norms involved in that procedure.  Can constructivism 
really go ‘all the way down’?  A lot more could be said of this matter and it is not exactly 
clear what it means, but for reasons of space I will only raise two worries about giving a 
constructivist account of the normativity of practical reason. 
One thing Korsgaard’s ‘all the way down’ phrase cannot mean is that we use some 
procedure to construct the correct procedure we then go on to use to construct true 
judgements; a kind of procedure for constructing procedures.  Such an account would invite 
an infinite regress; for then we can ask what establishes that procedure, and if it is a further 
procedure, what establishes this further procedure and so on.3 
Another way the constructivist cannot go ‘all the way down’ is by the procedure 
seemingly validating itself via its own procedure and creating its own correctness.  In effect 
this would mean practical reason constructing the norms of practical reason on its own.  It is 
not clear at all exactly how this could be possible; without norms to follow so as to correctly 
follow the procedure to result in construction, it looks like we are asking for norms to be 
constructed ex nihilo.4 
The best approach for the constructivist is to insist that the norms of practical reason 
are different enough from the judgemental norms that the constructivist is originally 
accounting for, that they do not have to give a constructivist account of them.  The 
constructivist could make the point that the norms constructed are embodied in judgements 
which can be either true or false, so the norms themselves can be either true or false.  This is 
not the case for the norms of practical reason; it makes sense to talk of such norms as either 
appropriate or inappropriate but not as true or false.  To use an analogy, we can ask whether 
the use of modus ponens in a particular instance is a valid use of such a norm, but what would 
                                                          
2 E.g. Budde (2009); Hussain (Forthcoming); LeBar (2008). 
3 Hussein and Shah (2006) effectively make this point. 
4 O’Neill (2002) actually tries to do something like this.  Although it would be interesting to explore how she 
relates her constructivism to the norms of practical reason, I have left it out for space.  For an argument as to 




it mean to ask if modus ponens were true?  It is just a norm that can be appropriately applied 
or not; what could even make it true or false?  As James puts it, ‘Propositions can be true or 
false.  Imperatives can be applicable or inapplicable in a given situation, or valid or invalid 
for an activity, but do not admit of truth or falsity’ (Forthcoming).  It is this truth or falsity of 
a normative judgement that constructivism aims to validate, not the norms of the constructive 
procedure. 
2.3 
How then is the constructivist to account for the norms of the procedure, the normativity of 
practical reason?  The rest of this paper will explore two options.  The first, what will occupy 
the rest of this chapter, is a formal account in the Kantian tradition; where substantive 
judgements are meant to be constructed out of merely formal specifications of practical 
reason.  The normativity of these formal specifications is given a constitutivist account by 
Korsgaard and James.  This faces a powerful objection by David Enoch which will require an 
adequate response by the constructivist if they wish to salvage their theory. 
As we saw in 2.1, Korsgaard and James both endorse formal views of the norms of 
practical reason: for Korsgaard, the hypothetical and categorical imperatives; for James, a 
series of general formal norms for directing our attention to features of the situation that 
embodies our practical problem.  Both sets of norms are formal in the sense that they do not 
make any specific recommendations or imperatives; they do not involve any instances when 
explicating what they are.  They are general guides for directing our thought in practical 
reason; when practically reasoning about a problem, then there will be substantive 
judgements involved, but the norms themselves as part of their nature do not make or involve 
specific guides or imperatives about particular instances.  The Norm of Attention Direction 
tells us nothing of what particular facts or possibilities to consider.  The hypothetical 
imperative does not tell us what particular ends to will, or what particular means to take, just 
that if you will an end then you ought to take the most efficient means, whatever that may be.  
Likewise for the categorical imperative; it does not say which laws we should universalise, 
only that we ought to only universalise those laws without pain of contradiction.  It could be 
interjected here that certain laws are barred because of the categorical imperative, thus 
meaning that there is a substantive element to it, that certain particulars are not allowed and 
that the norm does dictate to us certain instances, and is thus not entirely formal.  There may 
be some truth to this but what is crucial to note is that it is essentially formal.  That is, it is a 
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formal norm without any particular recommendations prior to any substantive input.  The 
norm stands alone as part of our practical reason without any substantive element; to get any 
substance from it, there has to be substantive input.  It is formal in that it gives structure to 
how we are to think about practical problems and makes no reference to particular 
judgements of what to do. 
This talk of ‘structure’ is important.  We saw in 2.1 the quote by James where he says 
that the norms of practical reason ‘structure one’s awareness of the facts of an agent’s 
situation and one’s reaction to the facts attended to’.  They can be said to ‘give shape’ to how 
we encounter and think about practical problems.  It is by having these norms that we think 
about the practical problems in the way that we do.  They are relevant to what we are 
accounting for in practical reason; if we are to account for practical reason then we must in 
part be accounting in part for what gives shape to it, gives it form, and thus in part making up 
what it is.  We can say then that following those norms is what it is to reason practically.  
Taking all this into account, it is unsurprising that philosophers who give a formal account of 
the norms of practical reason offer a constitutivist account of their normativity. 
The constitutivist holds that there are norms of practical reason as they are 
constitutive of it, of being an agent.  To count as being an agent and engaging in practical 
reason is to follow its norms.  What provides the standard of performing practical reason 
successfully comes from a better understanding of practical reason is itself.  An analogy may 
help.  Korsgaard asks us to imagine the building of a house (2009: 27-30).  What constitutes a 
‘house’ is that it has four walls, a roof that will give it shelter and keep out the rain, windows 
and doors and so on.  What it is to build a house successfully is to follow these standards that 
make a house what it is.  Anyone who claimed to be building a house and yet did not attempt 
to do any of these things would not be in the business of building a house; by not following 
the constitutive norms of house-building, you are not engaging in the activity of house-
building.  If a builder said ‘I’m trying to build a house, but why should I build something 
with four walls with a roof to keep out the rain?’, we would respond that he was confused; 
either you are following these norms or not genuinely trying to build a house.  Likewise with 
agency and practical reason; what it is to engage in practical reason well is to follow the 
norms that constitute practical reason.  To successfully build a house is to follow its 
constitutive norms; to engage in practical reason successfully is to follow its constitutive 
norms.  Whether one wants to do so or knows it, when one is engaging in practical reason one 
is following the norms of practical reason, and one can be doing this successfully or not.  
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Thus, the norms of practical reason have authority because we are always following them 
when we engage in practical reason.  A sceptical challenge can be met easily, just like we can 
meet a ‘chess-playing sceptic’ easily; if she said ‘Why ought I to move the bishop 
diagonally?’, all we have to say is ‘That is just what it is to play chess.’  Likewise with 
practical reason; if someone asked ‘Why should I reason practically in this way?’, we would 
say ‘Because that is just what it is to reason practically.’  The normative standards of 
practical reason come from what makes practical reason what it is: something with norms to 
follow.  These norms can be followed correctly or not and therefore the procedure of 
construction can be successful if the norms of practical reason were correctly followed. 
Both Korsgaard and James take a route like this.5  For Korsgaard, the aim of action is 
to constitute ourselves.  Our actions constitute who we are, and in that is constitutive of what 
an action is.  The standard for an action then is to what extent it constitutes you as an agent 
and the achievement of a kind of ‘psychic unity’; the norms of agency (or practical reason) 
have a normative status because they constitute something we are all engaged in: agency 
(Ibid: 25-6).  James avoids any lofty talk of ‘self-constitution’ and instead couches his 
constitutivism in terms of ‘understanding’ practical reasoning.  For James, successful 
practical reasoning is what constitutes ‘understanding of the ordinary activity of practical 
reasoning as the kind of activity it is’ (Forthcoming).  So when one has correctly followed the 
norms of practical reason, one can be said to understand the kind of activity it is and to have 
engaged in it properly; to engage in it properly then just is to follow its norms, so the norms 
are constitutive of what it is.  More can be said here, but what is important is that both 
Korsgaard and James, from their purely formal accounts of practical reason, offer a 
constitutivist account of their normativity; the norms of practical reason have authority 
because following them just is what is to engage in practical reason. 
2.4 
We can see then that the constructivist who takes a formal approach to the norms of practical 
reason is in some sense parasitic upon the constitutivism they employ to account for the 
normativity of the procedure of construction.  We can ask to what extent is the approach 
taken by Korsgaard and James in the spirit of constructivism, whether it can be consistent 
with constructivism that it is so parasitic on a different metanormative view.  When pushed to 
                                                          
5 So does Velleman (2000).  I have left out a discussion of his work for reasons of space and because he does 
not supplement his constitutivism with a constructivism about normative judgements. 
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answer why norms can be constructed, the constructivist has fallen back on a different 
account for the norms of the procedure. 
This should not be too much trouble for constructivists like Korsgaard and James; 
they can simply take it on the chin and accept that their constructivism has not gone ‘all the 
way down’ in the sense of ‘constructing’ the norms of the procedure.  As suggested in 2.2, 
James effectively says that the constructivist is only committed to a theory of normative 
judgements and how they are capable of being true.  As my account of constructivism in 
Chapter 1 showed, the constructivist thesis is one of the truth conditions of normative 
judgements and the metaphysical relation therein.  This is explained in terms of a procedure 
involving other norms; and thus, the norms constructed are explained in terms of other norms.  
The formal constructivist can simply say that the norms of practical reason have a kind of 
priority such that they cannot be given a constructivist account.  The norms of practical 
reason are better seen as norms for constructing other norms; they are the norms that are 
constitutive of our agency and practical reason and are the materials for the construction of 
normative judgements.  Their status as normative is prior to that of the normativity of any 
judgement, and this is best understood as their being constitutive.  Because of their priority as 
being constitutive of practical reason itself, they cannot be given a constructivist account.  
Constructivism then can rely on these norms with priority without threatening its account of 
the truth of normative judgements. 
2.5 
Formal constructivists like Korsgaard and James seem to be in a good position; they have 
accounted for the normativity of the procedure of construction by giving a constitutivist 
account of its norms that is compatible with a constructivist account of normative 
judgements.  If we are to attack their formal account of the norms of practical reason, their 
emphasis on the formality of the norms of practical reason, we best criticise their 
constitutivist account of their normativity.  The strongest objection to such an account comes 
from David Enoch and his ‘schmagency’ objection (2006; 2011).  The objection is relatively 
simple but powerful.  Even if the norms of practical reason are constitutive of agency and are 
what are to be followed if we are to properly count as agents, why care about being an agent?  
Enoch imagines an imaginary interlocutor saying to the constitutivist:6 
                                                          
6 The target of this quote is Korsgaard but the objection applies to constitutivism generally. 
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Classify my bodily movements and indeed me as you like.  Perhaps I cannot be classified as 
an agent without aiming to constitute myself.  But why should I be an agent?  Perhaps I can’t 
act without aiming at self-constitution, but why should I act.  If your reasoning works, this 
just shows that that I don’t care about agency or action.  I am perfectly happy being a 
schmagent – a nonagent who is very similar to agents but who lacks the aim (constitutive of 
agency but not of schmagency) of self-constitution (2006: 179). 
If normativity is meant to come from what is constitutive of practical reason, then we should 
have a normative standard to properly engage in the activity which has these constitutive 
standards.  But as Enoch argues, we apparently do not have an answer as to why we ought to 
engage in the activity at all; following the norms of the activity may be constitutive of it, but 
it is not constitutive of the activity to perform the activity in the first place.  The constitutivist 
account of the normativity of practical reason fails then.  The constitutivist account does not 
show why it is authoritative that we must engage in practical reason at all; if the norms of 
practical reason are constitutive of it, then such a norm to engage in it must be constitutive as 
well.  However, the schmagency objection shows that it is not. 
In the original paper (2006) and in the follow-up (2011), Enoch responds to a number 
of criticisms of the objection that I will not go into here.  It is important to note that if the 
constructivist is going to give any kind of constitutivist account of the normativity of 
practical reason then they must have some response to Enoch’s objection.  Sharon Street 
believes she has the resources for such a view in her version of constructivism.  The next 












3. Street’s Substantive Move 
3.1 
Street’s account of the procedure of construction differs from that of Korsgaard and James in 
that she makes what I am calling a ‘substantive move’ in her account of the norms of the 
procedure.  On her view, construction arises out of the commitments that are constitutive of 
our actually held normative judgements.  She does not say that we have to have any particular 
normative judgements for this to happen, but it is substantive in that she says the construction 
of true judgements does not occur without some normative judgements being held by the 
agent; practical reason cannot even get started without our holding some substantive 
judgements, whatever they may be.  Such judgements are essential to the procedure of 
construction as it is they that ultimately supply the standard for the construction of further 
judgements as true. 
In 1.1 I outlined the notion that the construction of judgements is done from the 
practical standpoint of agents.  This was partly drawn from Street who places great emphasis 
on the ‘practical point of view’.  I also discussed the notion of whether the construction 
should be seen as actual, in our world, or as hypothetical or idealised in some sense.  Street 
stresses the importance of seeing the practical point of view as a real one, in possession of 
real agents in our world and any discussion of constructivism without the practical point of 
view will be inadequate.  This is because she sees the relation between normative judgements 
and the practical point of view as one of ‘what does or doesn’t follow from within’ the latter 
(2010: 366).  What she means here by ‘does or does not follow from’ is something formal, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  She thinks there are commitments that hold simply because they are 
constitutive of what it is to hold a normative judgement.  It is from these commitments that 
are constitutive of holding a normative judgement that supply the standard for the 
construction of further normative judgements, for normative truth is constructed when 
judgements ‘withstand scrutiny’ from the standpoint of an agent’s further normative 
judgements.  She further says that there is ‘no normative truth independent of the practical 
point of view’, because there are no legislated standards without the practical point of view, 
‘that is, from the point of view of someone who already accepts some normative judgements 
or other’ (Ibid).  So, the procedure cannot get going and normative truth cannot be 
constructed without an actual agent holding their actual own normative judgements. 
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What does Street mean by ‘withstanding scrutiny’ from the standpoint of further 
judgements?  In 1.1 I outlined Rawls as an example of local constructivism.  The principles 
of justice are constructed from the standpoint of the Original Position which itself embodies 
certain normative judgements about liberal democracy.  The principles are chosen from the 
position because the agents recognise they are entailed from these normative judgements 
about liberal democracy.  They are thus consistent with the norms that embody the procedure 
and therefore ‘withstand scrutiny’.  The principles of justice are the ‘target judgements’ of the 
procedure and the normative judgements about liberal democracy embodied in the Original 
Position are the ‘grounding judgements’.  The principles of justice withstand scrutiny in that 
they are entirely consistent with and entailed by the normative judgements endorsed in the 
Original Position. 
Street has something very similar in mind with her version of constructivism.  The 
practical point of view is one that is held by agents when they endorse a normative 
judgement.  We obviously hold a whole host of normative judgements, some about moral 
duties, some about ourselves and our relations to our loved ones and life projects.  It is these 
judgements that supply the standard, constitutive of holding these judgements themselves, for 
judging a further normative judgement as true or not.  For example it is constitutive of my 
judging that ‘I ought to attend my friend’s birthday’ that I not judge ‘I ought to go to the 
cinema at the same time’.  If I held the latter judgement then I could not properly count as 
endorsing the former judgement.  So the judgement ‘I ought not to go to the cinema at the 
same time as my friend’s birthday’ is constitutive of my holding the original judgement.  This 
is a true normative judgement for me because of the normative judgements I hold.  The 
commitments of my normative judgements entail that I endorse the latter judgement; it is 
these commitments that we judge the truth of a judgement against; if the judgement is 
inconsistent with the commitments, it is false.  The constitutive commitments of our 
judgements supply the normative standard for construction in the procedure. 
The target judgement has to withstand scrutiny from all our other normative 
judgements, so we can imagine the procedure being like this.  Take some potential normative 
judgement J that can be endorsed by an agent A.  Then imagine the set of A’s normative 
judgements J*, which is all of their endorsed normative judgements except for J.  J is a true 
normative judgement if it withstands scrutiny from J*; that is, whether it accords with all the 
commitments that are constitutive of holding J*.  If it does withstand this procedure then J is 
a true practical judgement for A and can be considered as part of her set of normative 
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judgements.  This can be done for every one of A’s judgements, so we just subtract a 
judgement J from her set of normative judgements and see if it survives, and carry on doing 
this for all of her judgements.  This procedure applies to all of A’s normative judgements; 
they are true practical judgements for her if all her judgements can survive this procedure of 
scrutiny from the standpoint of all of her other judgements.  If an agent does this then they 
will have a mutually-supporting web of normative judgements, where each one is justified by 
all the others. 
Note that judgements about reasons are only ever judgements about the reasons for 
the agent in question in accordance with their already held judgements; there is a kind of 
relativism in play, something acknowledged by Street (2008: 226).  As the correctness 
standard for a judgement is set by the endorsed judgements of an agent, the correctness of the 
resulting judgement can only be correct for that agent; the constructed truth of the judgement 
is relative to that agent’s set of judgements.  The truth of ‘X is a reason to Y for A’ is a 
function of the normative judgements held by A and A only.  No other standpoint is 
providing the truth conditions. 
What is constitutive of holding normative judgements provides the standard for other 
judgements to be true; if they are consistent and coherent with those judgements and their 
commitments then the resulting judgement is true and supplies a normative reason for the 
agent in question.  Standards, for Street, have to be provided ‘from somewhere’; and this 
‘somewhere’ is an actually held view by an agent who can have judgements in accordance 
with this view or not. It is only by someone’s ‘own lights’, that is in regards to their already 
held normative judgements, that a judgement can be right or wrong.  Street thinks that maybe 
‘construct’ is not the right metaphor for her theory: ‘metaethical constructivism explains how 
all reasons are ultimately “constructed” – or to put is less misleadingly, entailed or given – 
from within the standpoint of creatures who take themselves to have reasons’ (Ibid: 228).  So 
for Street, normative judgements can be true because they are the outcome of a procedure; 
this procedure involves the actual judgements held by the agents and what is constitutive of 
holding these judgements supplying the standard for which further judgements are to be 
assessed; that is, they ‘withstand scrutiny’ from these judgements if they are consistent or 
coherent with them.  This is clearly a different view of practical reason as the procedure of 





As we saw with Korsgaard and James, the norms of practical reason are constitutive of 
practical reason itself; to engage in practical reason just is to follow those norms.  Street 
thinks there are certain commitments that are constitutive of holding a normative judgement 
at all.  If one does not follow these commitments, then one cannot really be said to hold that 
judgement at all.  With that in mind then, they cannot properly be said to be norms.  One 
cannot actually go wrong in following these commitments, for by not following the 
commitments one is not really endorsing the relevant judgement.  If they were norms one 
could be said to be endorsing the judgement and simply be making an error in ones following 
of the relevant commitments.  Failing to follow these commitments is better understood as an 
omission.  That is not to say one cannot make errors in one’s practical reasoning, it is just that 
we need to better characterise what Street thinks is involved in practical reasoning and what 
makes it normative. 
Practical reasoning, for Street, is best seen as an arena where one makes inferences 
from one’s already held judgements.  In an early paper she puts it like this: 
For what rational reflection about evaluative matters involves, inescapably, is assessing some 
evaluative judgements in terms of others.  Rational reflection must always proceed from some 
evaluative standpoint; it must work from some evaluative premises; it must treat some 
evaluative judgements as fixed, if only for the time being, as the assessment of other 
evaluative judgements is undertaken.  In rational reflection, one does not stand completely 
apart from one’s starting fund of evaluative judgements: rather, one uses them, reasons in 
terms of them, holds some of them up for examination in the light of others (2006: 124). 
The agent thinks through what is consistent or inconsistent, coherent or incoherent, with their 
already held normative judgements.  When engaging with their judgements in this way, 
seeing what can withstand scrutiny, the agent can clearly make errors.  One could make an 
inference from a judgement that was wrong, judging something right that is inconsistent with 
one’s held normative judgements, and be unaware of the false move.  It is odd to say if you 
do not make the inference you are not holding the judgement; one is simply not conscious of 
the error.  The agent would then be in the position that if they were so convinced of the 
original judgement then it is imperative for them to withdraw the judgement that arose out of 
the inference because it violates what is constitutive of it.  If one fails to follow through on a 
commitment that is constitutive of a normative judgement in full awareness, then we can 
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easily say they have made an omission: they are not really endorsing the judgement.  But in 
the arena of practical reason, whereby one can make right or wrong inferences from one’s 
judgements and still be said to hold that judgement, it is clear there are norms to follow; 
norms that are supplied by what is constitutive of the judgements held by an agent that have 
commitments one can rightly or wrongly make inferences from when engaging in practical 
reason.  Normative judgements supply the standards in practical reason, and these standards 
can be lived up to or not. 
These are constitutive norms, but they are constitutive of our already held substantive 
normative judgements, not practical reason.  When one is faced with a practical problem, one 
is to engage in practical reason, and the standards one is to live up to so as to arrive at the 
right conclusion are those that are constitutive of the judgements one already holds.  One 
follows the norms that one ought to follow if one can be said to hold these judgements, and 
by following these norms, one will arrive at a judgement that is coherent with one’s other 
judgements.  Practical reason has normative rules to follow because they are constitutive of 
holding a normative judgement, and the only way to engage in practical reason is from the 
standpoint of already held normative judgements: there is no other way to do it according to 
Street.  The only standards of correctness are those set by our normative judgements, so the 
normativity of practical reason comes from the constitutive commitments of our normative 
judgements; one ought to think in accordance with one’s judgements because they are 
constitutive of them.  You are making the constitutive judgement even if you are not aware of 
it and by not noticing this you are thereby making a mistake; you are failing to live up to the 
standards that are set by your own judgements.  ‘For one normative judgement to withstand 
scrutiny from the standpoint of other judgements, then, is for that judgement not to be 
mistaken as determined by the standards of correctness that are constitutively set by those 
other normative judgements in combination with the non-normative facts’ (Street 2008: 231).  
The normativity of practical reason is accounted for by the constitutive commitments of our 
already held judgements; we ought to think a certain way in practical reasoning because we 
are already committed to doing so by our own judgements. 
We can see how this differs from the formal accounts given by Korsgaard and James.  
Korsgaard and James in their constitutivism think that there are norms of practical reason 
because such norms are a part of what practical reason is; to engage in practical reason just is 
to follow these norms.  These norms are there for us to follow, as something constitutive of 
the kind of reasoning practical reason is.  These are norms that we can follow correctly or not 
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and our resulting judgements of practical reason are true if they follow such norms and false 
if they do not.  For Street, norms are constitutive and are to be followed in practical 
reasoning, but they are not constitutive of practical reason itself.  Rather, they are constitutive 
of holding a normative judgement.  It is when these judgements are used in practical 
reasoning that their constitutive commitments achieve the status of being norms or standards 
for us to live up to.  So because there are norms that constitute holding normative 
judgements, we must take into account our actually held substantive normative judgements 
when we are engaging in practical reasoning.  These are the only norms for us to follow in 
practical reason; those that are constitutive for us because they are constitutive of the 
judgements we happen to hold.  Korsgaard and James make no mention of this; there are 
norms for us to follow, we can do so correctly or not, and this is regardless of any of our 
normative judgements.  Street then, makes a substantive move from the formal accounts of 
Korsgaard and James in focusing on the role of substantive judgements in the normativity of 
practical reason.  Whilst she makes no point of mentioning any particular judgements we 
must have in practical reason, she does make the point of saying that some substantive 
judgements are required for us to be reasoning practically at all, for it is the rules of holding 
these judgements that will provide the standards for construction.  The normativity of 
practical reason then, comes from the norms that constitute using a normative judgement in 
such reasoning. 
3.3 
How can Street use this account to respond to Enoch’s schmagency objection?  We first need 
to look at comments she makes in a recent paper in regards to Korsgaard’s ‘regress 
argument.’  Korsgaard’s argument (1996, Ch. 3) aims to derive moral reasons from the 
standpoint of practical reason as such, in accordance with the kind of formal account outlined 
in Chapter 2.  Her point is that any agent has moral reasons just by the fact she is an agent.  
Korsgaard is trying to find the ‘source’ of normativity; what is it that could actually make our 
judgements authoritative, and believes she has found it in our identity as human beings.  My 
identity as a friend gives me certain normative reasons to behave in a certain way, but I can 
call this identity into question, asking for further reasons to endorse it.  This regress, it seems, 
can go on indefinitely, where we never find a normative reason to underpin all our identities 
and the reasons they supply.  According to Korsgaard, this line of questioning can only go so 
far because we eventually reach our identity as humans, as creatures who require certain 
identities to be able to act.  The regress cannot continue because we cannot ask for a reason to 
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have the identity of ‘human’; we already have such an identity and it supplies us with 
normative reasons, both for action and for having further identities.  So just by being human, 
a creature that engages in practical reason and requires identities, we are necessarily 
committed to our identity as humans and the reasons it supplies, and the regress ends. 
Street thinks this line of argument fails for reasons I will not go into7 and then goes on 
to argue for how she thinks the regress can end.  I outlined in 3.1 how Street views the 
procedure of construction, where judgements are entailed and justified by other judgements 
which are in turn justified in the same manner.  The result is a mutually-supporting web of 
normative judgements, all true for the agent in question, or as Street puts it ‘a coherent web 
of interlocking values, such that each one, when taken in its turn and examined from the 
standpoint of the others, stands up to scrutiny in terms of the standards those other values set’ 
(Forthcoming).  When scrutinised far enough we will reach the agent’s most held and 
justified normative judgements, ones that they could not do without so to speak.  When we 
pose the normative question, the one that the fear of regress arises from, we will ask ‘Why 
endorse this set of normative judgements?  Why this web as opposed to some other?’  Street 
thinks that questions of this sort posed to the web of constructed, mutually-supported 
judgements are actually ill-formulated and cannot be given a legitimate answer.  As we have 
seen, Street thinks it is only an agent’s normative judgements that can supply the standard for 
assessing a normative judgement and as the question is formed, there cannot be any answer 
because there are no standards to assess it by.  Stepping back and asking why one ought to 
endorse this set of judgments means suspending all of one’s judgements and thus all of the 
standards used to assess judgements; and without any standards we cannot even expect an 
answer.  The question is being posed ‘from nowhere’ where there are no standards and 
according to Street we cannot engage in practical reason in this way.  ‘One cannot sensibly 
step back from the entire set of one’s interlocking normative judgements at once, and ask, 
from nowhere, whether this set is correct or incorrect, for on a constructivist view there are 
no independent standards to fix an answer to this question’ (Ibid).  The question is 
illegitimate because there is no way for the set of judgements to withstand scrutiny from the 
standpoint of other normative judgements. 
I think we can see here the clues to how Street thinks there are resources in her 
account of practical reason to counter Enoch’s schmagency objection, which she mentions in 
                                                          




a footnote in a forthcoming paper (fn. 25).  Enoch’s objection was aimed at the kind of 
constitutivism outlined in Chapter 2, charging that the normativity of practical reason has not 
been accounted for because we can always question why an agent ought to engage in 
practical reason, why they ought to be an agent at all.  Even if the norms of practical reason 
are constitutive of it, such an account does not provide a constitutive norm to engage in 
practical reason.  So how would Street respond to this?  It would help to recast the question in 
terms Street would accept.  If Enoch is asking why be an agent we need to ask what it is to be 
an agent for Street.  As discussed, to be an agent is to adopt the practical point of view, where 
this means to endorse a normative judgement of some sort.  So, reformulated, Enoch’s 
question becomes ‘Why adopt any normative judgement at all?’  For Street then, this 
sceptical question will be one asked ‘from nowhere’; it is a question being posed from 
outside the practical point of view completely, thus suspending all normative judgements and 
their constitutive standards to judge any answer by, and thus is an illegitimate question.  
Practical reasoning requires substantive normative judgements for us to reason about 
normative matters and Enoch’s reformulated question does away with all of an agent’s 
substantive judgements.  There is no way of assessing whether one ought to adopt normative 
judgements instead of no normative judgements whatsoever; the only way of practically 
reasoning about such matters would be for us to have normative input in our reasoning and be 
done from the standpoint of some other normative judgements, but the nature of the question 
bars all normative input.  Therefore, we do not have to answer Enoch’s ‘schmagency’ 
objection because it is ill-formulated; there are no standards for us to judge any answer by.  
Her account of practical reasoning and its substantive move gives Street the resources to 
respond because she can insist that practical reasoning can only be done with an agent in 
possession of normative judgements, and the schmagency objection suspends all judgements. 
3.4 
Street would be too quick to brush off Enoch’s objection as unanswerable; her response falls 
prey to an objection that runs parallel to her response to the regress argument.  The objection 
argues that such questions are formulated perfectly fine, that there is definitely a way in 
which they can make sense, even if, as Street believes, there are no standards for them to be 
answered by.  To bring out this objection it will help by using a pair of examples, beginning 
with the one that applied to her response to the regress problem. 
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Street’s response to the regress problem was that the question was ill-formulated in 
that one cannot step back from one’s entire web of judgements and call them into question, 
not without being from the standpoint of some other normative judgement.  But we can 
question this.  Imagine a young man, Derek, who was once a ferment neo-Nazi.8  He spent 
much of his adult life involved with the movement, attending meetings, organising 
demonstrations, even engaging in violent criminal acts, such was his conviction in his deeply 
held racist ideology.  On Street’s constructivist view, Derek’s fascistic political beliefs could 
be a coherent web of interlocking normative judgements, each one justified by all the others.  
This mutually-supporting web of normative judgements provided Derek with meaning for 
much of his life, giving him purpose and motivation in his actions.  As the result of one 
event, an emotionally traumatic experience changed Derek’s normative outlook.  Derek was 
subject to a violent humiliation at the hands of people he thought were his Aryan ‘brothers’, 
leading him to question his deeply held political convictions.  Such a change in one’s 
emotional makeup leading to a change in one’s normative outlook is perfectly concurrent 
with Street’s view.  We enter the world with a set of ‘moral feelings’ that will at first 
determine our normative outlook.   Of course, such feelings and other parts of the subjective 
set of an agent are completely open to being changed, whether it is by conscious reflection or 
emotional experience.  Street herself mentions the possibility of ‘causal forces’ that ‘effect a 
radical change in one’s existing set of values’ (Forthcoming); we can include a violent 
violation and its accompanying emotional trauma as such causes.9  What Street does not 
mention is that such a cause can lead an agent to not just radically change their set of 
normative judgements, but to completely call them into question.  This is exactly what 
happened to Derek: his violation led him to question every one of his previous normative 
judgements being that they were united by a fascistic outlook that has now been destroyed.  
He has no standard to judge them by and nor could he: the only standard he ever felt was real 
was one of Aryan purity, and that standard has now been knocked from his psyche by the 
actions of his former ‘brothers’.  Due to their actions, he now questions everything he has 
previously believed; he can be said to be standing back from his web of interlocking 
judgements and asking why he ought to believe in them.  And this is exactly what Street says 
is impossible, because a legitimate question of this type must have a standard to judge it by.  
But this is a legitimate question for Derek: he has no standards for evaluation precisely 
                                                          
8 This example is adapted from the film American History X (Dir. Tony Kaye, 1998). 
9 I do not have the space to go discuss the role of emotions in normative thinking.  I simply take it as plausible 
that traumatic emotional experiences can have an effect on one’s normative outlook. 
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because they have just been forcibly removed from his mind by violent actions.  The ridding 
of all of his standards and the questioning of his web of judgements came at the same time 
when he was brutalised by his friends. 
If we think that the case of Derek is possible, and it seems to me that it is, then we 
must question Street’s response to the regress problem.  Street thinks the regress ends 
because we cannot legitimately question why we ought to endorse an entire set of normative 
judgements; but my example shows that the question can indeed be legitimate.  Therefore, 
Street was wrong to conclude that the regress ends in the way she thinks.  Indeed, it is this 
weakness in the notion of standards being essential for a normative question to be legitimate 
that stops Street from having an adequate response to Enoch’s schmagency objection.  The 
example shows that, contra Street, we can legitimately ask normative questions without any 
of the normative standards she thinks are necessary. 
We saw that Street can possibly answer the schmagency objection by insisting that the 
question cannot be legitimate.  We cannot ask whether we ought to adopt the normative 
standpoint, and effectively ask whether we ought to adopt any normative judgement 
whatsoever, because to be able to answer a normative question we need normative standards, 
and the question extracts away all standards because it is asking whether we ought to have 
any such standards.  Again, we can imagine an example where the question posed seems 
entirely legitimate, betraying no conceptual confusion.  Imagine Albert; a young man who 
has suffered an emotional trauma, let us say the loss of a loved one, and is now going through 
a kind of existential crisis.  He is in the grip of nihilistic thoughts, questioning whether 
anything has value, whether he ought to care about anything at all, whether any normative 
judgements are at all justified.  He is questioning why he ought to adopt any normative 
standpoint, whether there really are any standards for assessment at all and whether he ought 
to care about any such standards.  He is then posing what Street thinks is an illegitimate 
question: whether we ought to adopt any normative standpoint at all.  Albert has suspended 
all of his normative judgements, as he is questioning them altogether, and with them any such 
standards constitutive of them.  But of course he has suspended any standards: he is 
questioning whether he ought to care about standards; indeed, it was the trauma of losing a 
loved one that shook his conviction in standards and with it led to the questioning of caring at 
all.  In one motion, an emotional event, this time the loss of a loved one, rid Albert of his 
standards and made him question them.  He is posing the question ‘from nowhere’; in his 
malaise he is asking for a justification for the adoption of any normative judgement.  Albert is 
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currently sceptical of whether he ought to care about anything at all and is need of some 
convincing answer as to why he ought to endorse any normative judgement, and whether he 
ought to care about any normative standards. 
If we think this is possible for an agent – I think it is possible and we know that such 
people sadly do exist in our world – then we can see that Street has failed to answer Enoch’s 
schmagency objection.  In fact, it has come back in a more pertinent and familiar form: the 
normative sceptic.  Street thinks Enoch’s schmagency objection does not hold because it 
cannot be legitimately asked as there are no standards for it to be answered.  But as we have 
seen with the example of Albert, this question can legitimately be asked.  If the question can 
be legitimately asked then Street has not answered the schmagency objection of why we 
ought to adopt any normative standpoint. 
3.5 
How can Street respond to this objection and revive her chances of answering the 
schmagency objection?  Maybe she would respond by suggesting that the example of Albert 
is too extreme.  Can we really imagine someone who questioned every single normative 
judgement, who did not care about anything at all?  Surely Albert makes even minimal 
normative judgements such as ‘I need to urinate so I ought to go to the bathroom’.  The first 
thing to say is that the example is not too extreme; sadly this experience of a loss of all value 
in the world is a real one experienced by too many people: they really do question whether 
anything at all in the world is worth caring about.  As for the notion of making minimal 
judgements, Albert may think that he ought to go to the bathroom and is then motivated by 
the judgement, but that does not take away from the fact that in his malaise he really does 
question whether it is worth caring about, along with everything.  Plus, it may be the case that 
in such a depressive daze he could be barely said to be making normative judgement about 
going to the bathroom, actually acting upon something closer to instinct. 
Following from this point, Street may say because of his deep malaise and existential 
crisis there is some kind of error in Albert’s thinking; he is not thinking clearly because of the 
malaise and is therefore doing the illegitimate thing of questioning all normative judgements.  
Albert maybe slightly offended by this claim; he might say that he is in fact thinking very 
clearly on these matters and that is why he is in such a malaise.  He is thinking about these 
matters constantly, exhausting himself mentally on them.  Those in the grip of a kind nihilism 
are almost thinking too much about these matters, in the sense that they are exhausting 
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themselves, not thinking about the simple pleasures in life maybe.  But this does not suggest 
an absence of rational thinking.  Street would need some kind of argument to show that those 
gripped by nihilism cannot think clearly about normative matters. 
Perhaps the best route for Street would be to argue from the other way round; that 
there is something about normative thought that bars them from being called into question in 
the fashion Albert is doing.  Perhaps Street will say that there must be some standard at work 
there; that Albert really is questioning normative judgements from some standpoint and is 
just unaware of it; otherwise he does not really count as conducting a normative enquiry.  But 
this begs the question; what is at issue here is whether constitutive standards held by the 
agent are necessary for normative questions to be sensibly raised.  To make the claim that 
standards must be involved for a normative question to be raised assumes exactly what Street 
is being taken to task for. 
There must be something else that is essential to normative thought if Street is to try 
and block Albert’s question.  Part of what seems to be Street’s issue is that she does not think 
that practical reasoning can get started without any ‘normative input’ so to speak; that is, 
normative practical reasoning must always be done from the standpoint of some normative 
judgement or other so that the target judgment can attempt to withstand scrutiny.  Why 
exactly does she think this?  The answer has to be something like this: without a normative 
standpoint we do not have any standards for practical reason and thus it cannot get started and 
therefore no judgements can be assessed.  If we asked Street why she thinks we need such 
standards, then surely she will say something like this: without such standards, practical 
reasoning is impossible.  But this would be circular: she would be saying that the normative 
standpoint is essential to practical reason because it supplies the standards for engagement, 
and such standards are essential to getting practical reasoning going because they are from 
the normative standpoint.  Of course, this is not to say that practical reasoning needs no 
standards.  Of course we need norms to follow in practical reasoning, how else could we 
attempt to reason to any answers?  The point is that we do not need the kind of standards 
Street thinks are essential, ones that are constitutive of our substantive judgements.  Derek 
and Albert seem to be engaging in practical reason fine without the kind of standards Street 
thinks are essential.  Therefore her account of practical reason cannot be right and does not 





Street’s account of the procedure of construction has it that the agent constructs normative 
judgments from the practical point of view which necessarily embodies normative 
judgements.  The resulting judgement is constructed if it is entailed by the judgements 
embodied in the practical point of view.  The normative judgments endorsed by the agent 
then provide the standards for the procedure; there are certain constitutive commitments of 
holding judgements such that if one does not consciously follow those commitments, they 
cannot be said to be endorsing the original judgements.  So when engaged in practical reason, 
the norms are those constitutive commitments; the agent can correctly or incorrectly make the 
inferences from the judgements in the practical point of view.  For Street, the normativity of 
practical reason is accounted for by those commitments; they are normative for the agent in 
question because they are constitutive of their own judgements.  The agent ought to follow 
the norms of the procedure because those norms are constitutive of their judgements.  Street’s 
substantive move, her emphasis on the role of substantive judgements in practical reason, 
gives her an account of practical reason with a possible response to Enoch’s schmagency 
objection.  Enoch’s objection raised the challenge of whether constitutivism, of the kind 
provided by Korsgaard and James, has really given us a full account of the normativity of 
practical reason; while certain norms may be constitutive of agency and practical reason, we 
can ask whether there is a constitutive norm to be an agent.  Street’s possible response was 
that, because practical reason necessarily involves being in the practical point of view, and 
the practical point of view just is the endorsement of some normative judgement, we cannot 
step outside the practical point of view and ask whether we ought to adopt it.  To do so would 
rid us of any standards for which to assess any answer to the question; normative questions 
can only be asked from a normative standpoint, and Enoch’s challenge involves no normative 
standpoint and is therefore illegitimate.  My objection to Street challenges the notion that we 
must be endorsing some normative standpoint to ask legitimate normative questions.  My 
examples of Derek and Albert involved agents seriously asking normative questions but 
without endorsing any normative judgement and thus without the kind of standards Street 
thinks are necessary for practical reason.  If practical reason can be done in the way I think is 
possible, as shown with Derek and Albert, then Street has not answered Enoch’s objection 
and therefore not given a full account of the normativity of practical reason.  If practical 
reasoning is possible without substantive judgements being involved, then accounting for the 
normativity of practical reason with those substantive judgements is wrong.  Street’s 
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substantive move gave a promising proposal for the constructivist project, but the substantive 
move opened her up to the classical foe of the normative sceptic who brings down how she 




























In this paper I have explored constructivism as a metanormative theory about how normative 
judgements can be true.  The possibility of truth for normative judgements was explained in 
terms of the correct following of the norms of practical reason.  This required the 
constructivist to give an account of the normativity of practical reason.  We saw that those 
philosophers in the Kantian tradition who give a purely formal account of the norms of 
practical reason rely on a constitutivist theory of the normativity of practical reason.  We then 
saw that constitutivism runs into Enoch’s powerful ‘schmagency’ objection.  Street’s version 
of constructivism and its accompanying account of practical reason was then explored to see 
if her substantive move provides her with the resources to deal with Enoch’s objection.  It 
was argued that Street cannot answer Enoch’s objection due to a weakness in her account of 
practical reason.  Being that a kind of constitutivism is the most obvious route for a 
constructivist and the one taken by the most prominent constructivists, where does this leave 
constructivism? 
 The constructivist could say that Street’s substantive move is not necessary to try and 
counter Enoch’s objection and that a purely formal account is fine the way it is.  All that has 
to be done, the constructivist could say, is to directly undermine Enoch’s objection, and then 
we will have our constitutivism intact and thus an account of the normativity of the procedure 
of construction.  Perhaps they could argue that there is something so fundamentally different 
between the activity of agency and any other activity that it does not make sense to pose 
Enoch’s question.  Similarly, they could argue that agency is such a thing that need not and 
cannot have a norm for engagement in it.  This is roughly what Luca Ferrero (2009) has 
argued, and whilst it has been challenged by Enoch (2011), it could still possibly be a fruitful 
avenue. 
 Another possibility not explored in this paper and one woefully neglected in the 
literature can be found in the work of Mark LeBar (2008) and his ‘Aristotelian 
constructivism’.  LeBar goes further than Street’s substantive move in that he thinks that the 
norms of practical reason involve an entirely substantive norm for directing our practical 
thought: eudaimonia.  Not only is this substantive norm one we must be directed by in our 
practical thinking if we are to count as reasoning practically, LeBar holds that it is a norm 
that is in fact constructed, thus reopening the possibility of constructivism going ‘all the way 
down’.  Whilst similar challenges to the ones in this paper will re-emerge, concerning 
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whether an agent can count as reasoning practically if they are not reasoning in accordance 
with eudaimonia, the fact that it is a constructed, substantive norm means that new avenues of 
possibility may be opened up for constructivism. 
 The last possibility I wish to mention is one unexplored as far as I know.  The 
constructivist could attempt a unified theory of normative judgments – both epistemic and 
practical – so that reasons for both belief and action are constructed once constitutive norms 
have been followed.  The constructivist could argue, in the vein of someone like Wedgwood 
(2002), that belief has an aim and that therefore gives theoretical reasoning constitutive 
norms.  The constructivist could then suggest that this is structurally similar to practical 
reason and therefore invites a unified account of normativity, perhaps one regarding 
constitutive norms of thought in general.  Again, some kind of schmagency equivalent will 
arise for theoretical reasoning – we can imagine an interlocutor asking why she ought to care 
about being a theoretical enquirer – but if the possibility of a unified account of normativity is 
fully explored by a constructivist, resources may become available for them to respond to it 
head on.  Plus, if the constructivist is to focus on the importance of epistemic norms in 
understanding the norms of practical reason, this may supply further resources. 
This has all been rather vague and speculative, but I hope it suggests that it is not 
quite game over for the constructivist.  No matter what route the constructivist takes however, 
if they are to account for the truth of normative judgements in terms of the norms of practical 
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